benefit his friends and harm his enemies; Note: 71e
And so of the virtues, however many and different they may be, they have all a common nature which makes them virtues; Note: 72d
Then now that the sameness of all virtue has been proven, try and remember what you and Gorgias say that virtue is. Note: 73c
virtue is 'the power of governing;' but do you not add 'justly and not unjustly'? Note: 73d
in searching after one virtue we have found many, though not in the same way as before; but we have been unable to find the common virtue which runs through them all. Note: 74a
Shape is the only thing which always follows Color. Note: 75b
Shape is the Limit of a solid. Note: 76a
Color is an effluence of form, commensurate with sight, and palpable to sense. Note: 76d
'Virtue is the desire of things honorable and the power of attaining them.' Note: 77b
do those who think that they will do them good know that they are evils? Note: 77d
ignorant of their nature Note: 77e
for what is misery but the desire and possession of evil? Note: 78a
virtue is the power of getting silver and gold; and would you add that they must be gained piously, justly, or do you deem this to be of no consequence? Note: 78d
Then the acquisition of such goods is no more virtue than the non-acquisition and want of them, but whatever is accompanied by justice or honesty is virtue, and whatever is devoid of justice is vice. Note: 78e
But then, my friend, do not suppose that we can explain to any one the nature of virtue as a whole through some unexplained portion of virtue, or anything at all in that fashion; we should only have to ask over again the old question, What is virtue? Note: 79d
You argue that a man cannot inquire either about that which he knows, or about that which he does not know; Note: 80e
The soul, then, as being immortal, and having been born again many times, and having seen all things that exist, whether in this world or in the world below, has knowledge of them all; and it is no wonder that she should be able to call to remembrance all that she ever knew about virtue, and about everything; for as all nature is akin, and the soul has learned all things; Note: 81c
But do you suppose that he would ever have inquired into or learned what he fancied that he knew, though he was really ignorant of it, until he had fallen into perplexity under the idea that he did not know, and had desired to know? Note: 84c
Then he who does not know may still have true Opinions of that which he does not know? Note: 85c
he will recover his knowledge for himself, if he is only asked questions? Note: 85d
his Soul must have always possessed this knowledge, Note: 86a
The next question is, whether virtue is knowledge or of another species? Note: 87c
if knowledge embraces all good, then we shall be right in thinking that virtue is knowledge? Note: 87d
And in general, all that the soul attempts or endures, when under the guidance of wisdom, ends in happiness; but when she is under the guidance of folly, in the opposite? Note: 88c
if virtue is profitable, virtue must be a sort of wisdom or prudence? Note: 88d
But if the good are not by nature good, are they made good by instruction? Note: 89c
for consider now and say whether Virtue, and not only virtue but anything that is taught, must not have teachers and disciples? Note: 89d
I have certainly often inquired whether there were any, and taken great pains to find them, and have never succeeded; Note: 89e
Of all the people who profess that they know how to do men good, do you mean to say that these are the only ones who not only do them no good, but positively corrupt those who are entrusted to them, and in return for this disservice have the face to demand money? Note: 91c
Any Athenian gentleman, taken at random, if he will mind him, will do far more good to him than the Sophists. Note: 92e
Can we call those teachers who do not acknowledge the possibility of their own vocation? Note: 95b
And while he has true opinion about that which the other knows, he will be just as good a guide if he thinks the truth, as he who knows the truth? Note: 97b
Then right opinion is not less useful than Knowledge? MENO: The difference, Socrates, is only that he who has knowledge will always be right; but he who has right opinion will sometimes be right, and sometimes not. Note: 97c
Now this is an illustration of the nature of true opinions: while they abide with us they are beautiful and fruitful, but they run away out of the human soul, and do not remain long, and therefore they are not of much value until they are fastened by the tie of the cause; and this fastening of them, friend Meno, is recollection, as you and I have agreed to call it. Note: 98a
Then, Meno, the conclusion is that virtue comes to the virtuous by the gift of God. Note: 100b