Things are said to be named 'equivocally' when, though they have a common name, the definition corresponding with the name differs for each. Note: 1a1

On the other hand, things are said to be named 'univocally' which have both the name and the definition answering to the name in common. Note: 1a7

Things are said to be named 'derivatively', which derive their name from some other name, but differ from it in termination. Note: 1a14

When one thing is predicated of another, all that which is predicable of the predicate will be predicable also of the subject. Note: 1b10

for the greater class is predicated of the lesser, so that all the differentiae of the predicate will be differentiae also of the subject. Note: 1b20

For every assertion must, as is admitted, be either true or false, whereas expressions which are not in any way composite such as 'man', 'white', 'runs', 'wins', cannot be either true or false. Note: 2a5

Substance, in the truest and primary and most definite sense of the word, is that which is neither predicable of a subject nor present in a subject; Note: 2a15

both the name and the definition of the predicate must be predicable of the subject. Note: 2a25

For instance, 'white' being present in a body is predicated of that in which it is present, for a body is called white: the definition, however, of the colour white' is never predicable of the body. Note: 2a30

Thus everything except primary substances is either predicated of primary substances, or is present in them, and if these last did not exist, it would be impossible for anything else to exist. Note: 2b5

For if any one should render an account of what a primary substance is, he would render a more instructive account, and one more proper to the subject, by stating the species than by stating the genus. Note: 2b10

Thus we have a second ground for asserting that the species is more truly substance than the genus. Note: 2b20

Further, primary substances are most properly so called, because they underlie and are the subjects of everything else. Note: 3a1

Substance, again, does not appear to admit of variation of degree. Note: 4a1

The most distinctive mark of substance appears to be that, while remaining numerically one and the same, it is capable of admitting contrary qualities. Note: 4a10

In short, there is nothing which can alter the nature of statements and opinions. Note: 4a35

Quantity is either discrete or continuous. Moreover, some quantities are such that each part of the whole has a relative position to the other parts: others have within them no such relation of part to part. Note: 4b20

A man might, indeed, argue that 'much' was the contrary of 'little', and 'great' of 'small'. But these are not quantitative, but relative; Note: 5b15

For though substance is capable of admitting contrary qualities, yet no one is at the same time both sick and healthy, nothing is at the same time both white and black. Nor is there anything which is qualified in contrary ways at one and the same time. Note: 6a1

To lie, to stand, to be seated, are not themselves attitudes, but take their name from the aforesaid attitudes. Note: 6b10

But this is not the mark of all relatives; 'double' and 'triple' have no contrary, nor indeed has any such term. Note: 6b15

Occasionally, perhaps, it is necessary to coin words, if no word exists by which a correlation can adequately be explained. Note: 7a5

for the object of perception is, it appears, prior to the act of perception. Note: 8a5

With regard to primary substances, it is quite true that there is no such possibility, for neither wholes nor parts of primary substances are relative. Note: 8a15

One sort of quality let us call 'habit' or 'disposition'. Habit differs from disposition in being more lasting and more firmly established. Note: 8b30

Those conditions, however, which arise from causes which may easily be rendered ineffective or speedily removed, are called, not qualities, but affections: Note: 9b20

Things are said to be opposed in four senses: (i) as correlatives to one another, (ii) as contraries to one another, (iii) as privatives to positives, (iv) as affirmatives to negatives. Note: 11b17

Neither in the case of contraries, nor in the case of correlatives, nor in the case of 'positives' and 'privatives', is it necessary for one to be true and the other false. Note: 13b1

But in the case of affirmation and negation, whether the subject exists or not, one is always false and the other true. Note: 13b26

There are four senses in which one thing can be said to be 'prior' to another. Primarily and most properly the term has reference to time: in this sense the word is used to indicate that one thing is older or more ancient than another, for the expressions 'older' and 'more ancient' imply greater length of time. Secondly, one thing is said to be 'prior' to another when the sequence of their being cannot be reversed. Note: 14a27

Yet it would seem that besides those mentioned there is yet another. For in those things, the being of each of which implies that of the other, that which is in any way the cause may reasonably be said to be by nature 'prior' to the effect. Note: 14b10

There are six sorts of movement: generation, destruction, increase, diminution, alteration, and change of place. Note: 15a15