The terms are whatever can be regarded as the subject of the proposition, while the concepts are the predicates or relations asserted of these terms. The terms of elementary propositions we will call individuals; these form the first or lowest type(lk76)
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Only on the presupposition of time can we represent to ourselves a number of things as existing at one and the same time or at different times(kA31)
Time is a pure form of sensible intuition(kA32)
Time is the formal a priori condition of all appearances whatsoever(kA34)
We deny to time all claim to absolute reality(kA36)
Time is given a priori(kB46)
Time has only one dimension as space has only three(kB47)
Time is nothing but the intuition of ourselves and of our inner state(kB50)
Time is the formal condition of inner sense to which all our knowledge is subject to(kA99)
If we ascribe succession to time itself, we must think yet another time, in which the sequence would be possible(kA183)
The order, not the lapse, of time is important(kA203)
Time itself cannot be perceived(kB219)
All existence and all change in time have thus to be viewed as simply a mode of the existence of that which remains and persists(kB229)
All appearances of succession in time are one and all only alterations(kB233)
All determination of time presupposes something permanent in perception. This cannot be something in me, since it is only through this permanent that my existence in time can itself be determined(kB276)
(1009a6) If all opinions and appearances are true, all statements must be at the same time true and false
Classes and relations cannot be added together to form a new single class, because they are of different logical 'types'(imp53)
Apart from such words as "this" and "that", every name is a description involving some this, and is only a name in virtue of the truth of some proposition(hk94)
"This" might be taken as the only egocentric word not having a nominal definition. The word "this" is, in a sense, a proper name, but it differs from true proper names in the fact that its meaning is continually changing(hk100)
"This" denotes whatever, at the moment when the word is used, occupies the center of attention(hk107)
Truth hinges on reality; but to object, on this score, to calling sentences true, is a confusion. 'Snow is white' is true if and only if snow is white. Quotation marks make all the difference between talking about words and talking about snow. The quotation is a name of a sentence that contains a name, namely 'snow', of snow. By calling the sentence true, we call snow white, and we need not emphasize the proposition as the truth-bearer(pol11)
Tarski saw the three satisfaction conditions not as explaining negation, conjunction, and quantification, which would be untenable, but as contributing to a definition of satisfaction itself and so, derivatively, of truth. This plan affords a definition of satisfaction, for all sentences of the object language, which is recursive or inductive(pol40)
To know a thing completely, we must know every possible predicate, and must determine it thereby, either affirmatively or negatively(k489)
Thinking is as inseparable from the soul as extension is from body(LO111)
(429b24) If thinking is a passive affection, then if thought is simple and impassible and has nothing in common with anything else, how can it come to think at all?