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A FANDOM User

Philosophy wiki

In addition to this wiki, there is a new wiki on philosophy, especially ethics: CodeWOW.
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Hinduism

Okay so what do u think of Hinduism as Bill?
I consider that u read the wikipedia article on hinduism.
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A FANDOM User

philosophy

why is philosophy important in teacher education?
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Aristotle

Aristotle, though more empirical and more biological than Plato, still thought the capacity for doing sums so remarkable that the arithmetical part of the soul must be immortal(lk368)
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Science

One of the aims of both science and common sense is to replace the shifting subjectivity of egocentric particulars by neutral public terms(hk101)
Five postulates required to validate scientific method:

quasi-permanence
separable causal lines
spatio-temporal continuity in causal lines
common causal origin of similar structures ranged about a center
analogy

The above postulates are probably not stated in their logically simplest form, and it is likely that further investigation would show that they are not all necessary for scientific inference. Induction, we have seen, is not quite the universal proposition that we need to justify scientific inference. But we most certainly do need some universal proposition or propositions, whether the five canons suggested or something different. And whatever these principles of inference may be, they certainly cannot be logically deduced from facts of experience. Either, therefore, we know something independently of experience, or science is bullshit(hk506)
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Skolem

The Lowenheim-Skolem theorem states if all of a class of quantificational schemata come out true together under an interpretation in a nonempty universe, they come out true together under some interpretation in the universe of positive integers(mol209)
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Thales

(294a28) Thales thought earth floating on water
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Parmenides

(182b26) Some think that being and one mean the same; while others solve the argument of Zeno and Parmenides by asserting that being and one are used in a number of ways
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Frege

It is obvious at once that ancestor must be capable of definition in terms of 'parent' but until Frege developed his generalized theory of induction, no one could have defined 'ancestor' precisely in terms of 'parent'(imp26)
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Democritus

(184b21) If the principles in question are infinite then they are one in kind, but differing in shape as Democritus believed; or different in kind and even contrary
(188a22) Democritus makes the contraries principles, which his plenum and void, both of which exist, he says, the one as being, the other as not being. Again he speaks of differences in position, shape and order and these are genera of which the species are contraries, namely, of position, above and below, before and behind; of shape, angular and angle-less, straight and round
(194a20) If we look at the ancients, natural science would seem to be concerned with the matter (It was only slightly that Democritus touched on form and essence)
(203a20) Democritus makes the elements infinite in number and says that the infinite is continuous by contact- compounded of the seed mass of the atomic shapes
(203a33) Democritus asserts that no element arises from another element, nevertheless the common Body is a principle of all things, differing from part to part in size and its shape
(213a34) It is not then the existence of air that needs to be proved, but the non-existence of an interval, different from the bodies, either separable or actual - an interval which divides the whole body so as to break its continuity, as Democritus holds
(251b16) But so far as time is concerned we see that all with one exception are in agreement in saying that it is uncreated: in fact, it is just this that enables Democritus to show that all things cannot have had a becoming; for time, he says, is uncreated
(252a34) Thus Democritus reduces the causes that explain nature to the fact that things happened in the past in the same way as they happen now; but he does not think fit to seek for a principle to explain this 'always'
(300b8) Hence Democritus, who says that the primary bodies are in perpetual movement in the void or infinite, may be asked to explain the manner of their motion and the kind of movement which is natural to them
(303a4) The primary masses, according to Democritus, are infinite in number and indivisible in mass: one cannot turn into many nor many into one: and all things are generated by their combination and involution. Now this view in a sense makes things out to be numbers or composed of numbers. The exposition is not clear, but this is its real meaning. And further, they say that since the atomic bodies differ in shape, and there is an infinity of shapes, there is an infinity of simple bodies
(305a35) Democritus reduces the generation of elements out of one another to an illusion
(307a17) Democritus makes even the sphere a kind of angle, which cuts things because of its mobility
(312a21) Democritus says that the warm bodies moving up out of the water hold up heavy bodies which are broad, while the narrow ones fall through, because the bodies which offer resistance to them are not numerous
(323b10) Democritus asserts that agent and patient are identical, i.e. like. He says it is not possible that others, i.e. differents, should suffer action from one another
(327a25) This theory abolishes alteration; but we see the same body liquid at one time and solid at another, without losing its continuity. It has suffered this change not by division and composition, nor yet by 'turning' and 'interconnect' as Democritus asserts; for it has passed from the liquid to the solid state without any reordering or transposition in its nature
(356b10) Democritus thinks that the sea is diminishing
(365a18) Democritus says that the earth is full of water and that when a quantity of rain water is added to this an earthquake is the result
(403b31) Democritus says that soul is a sort of fire or hot substance; his 'forms' or atoms are infinite in number; those which are spherical he calls fire and soul; the spherical atoms are identified with soul because atoms of that shape are most adapted to permeate everywhere, and to set all the others moving by being themselves in movement. This implies the view that soul is identical with what produces movement in animals
(404a27) Democritus identifies soul and mind, for he identifies what appears with what is true; he does not employ mind as a special faculty dealing with truth, but identifies soul and thought
(405a8) Democritus says soul and thought are one and the same thing and this thing must be one of the primary and indivisible bodies and its power of originating movement must be due to its fineness of grain and the shape of its atoms; he says that of all the shapes the spherical is the most mobile, and that this is the shape of the particles of both fire and thought
(406b17) Democritus says that the spherical atoms owing to their own ceaseless movements draw the whole body after them and so produce its movements
(409a12) It must be all the same whether we speak of units or corpuscles; for if the spherical atoms of Democritus became points, nothing being retained but their being a quantum, there must remain in each a moving and a moved part, just as there is in what is continuous; what happens has nothing to do with the size of the atoms, it depends solely upon their being a quantum. That is why there must be something to originate movement in the Units. If in the animal what originates movement is the soul, so also must it be in the case of the number, so that not the mover and the moved, but the mover only, will be the soul. But how is it possible for one of the units to fulfill this function? There must be some difference between such a unit and all the other units, and what difference can there be between one unit-point and another except a difference of position?
(419a15) Democritus misrepresents the facts when he expresses the opinion that if the interspace were empty one could distinctly see an ant on the vault of the sky
(438a5) Democritus is right in his opinion that the eye is of water
(442b10) Democritus asserts that black is rough and white is smooth, while he reduces savors to the atomic shapes
(464a5) Democritus alleges phantoms and emanations as the cause of precognitive dreams
(472a3) Democritus says respiration prevents the soul from being extruded from the body
(623a32) Spiders spin webs, not from their interior as an excretion, as Democritus says, but off their body as a kind of tree-bark
(640b30) Does configuration and color constitute the essence of the various animals? Democritus says that it is evident to everyone what form it is that makes the man, seeing that he is recognizable by his shape and color
(642a25) Our predecessors failed to hit upon this method as they were not in possession of the notion of essence, nor of any definition of substance. The first who came near it was Democritus, he was far from adopting it as a necessary method in natural science, but was merely brought to it by constraint of facts
(665a30) Democritus believed that animals too small to see their viscera still had them
(975b28) Democritus declares that water and air and each of the many things that exist are essentially the same, but differ in their 'rhythm'
(1009a27) Democritus says the void and the full exist alike in every part, yet one of these is being, and the other non-being
(1009b11) Democritus says that either there is no truth or to us at least it is not evident
(1039a9) Democritus says one thing cannot come from two nor two from one; for he identifies his indivisible magnitudes with substances. It is clear therefore that the same will hold good of number, if number is a synthesis of units, as is said by some; for two is either not one, or there is no unit present in it actually
(1042b12) Democritus seems to think that there are three kinds of difference between things; the underlying body, the matter, is one and the same, but they differ either in rhythm, i.e. shape, or in turning, i.e. position, or in inter-contact, i.e. order
(1078b20) Socrates became the first to raise the problem of universal definitions- of the natural scientists only Democritus touched on the matter and defined, after a fashion, the hot and the cold
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Leucippus

(1071b32) This is why some suppose eternal actuality; e.g. Leucippus and Plato; for they say there is always movement
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Heraclitus

(104b22) Heraclitus says that all things are in motion
(159b30) Heraclitus says that good and evil are the same thing
(205a3) Heraclitus says that at some time all things become fire
(298b30) What the earliest natural philosophers maintained was that all else is being generated and is flowing, nothing having any stability, except one single thing which persists as the basis of all these transformations. So we may interpret the statements of Heraclitus
(355a14) A flame is in a process of becoming, involving a constant interchange of moist and dry. It cannot be said to be nourished since it scarcely persists as one and the same for a moment. This cannot be true of the sun; for if it were nourished like that, we should obviously not only have a new sun every day, as Heraclitus says, but a new sun every moment
(401a10) All are born and come to their prime and decay in obedience to the ordinances of God, as Heraclitus says
(405a25) Heraclitus too says that the first principle- the warm exhalation of which, according to him, everything else is composed- is soul; further, that this exhalation is most incorporeal and in ceaseless flux; that what is in movement requires that what knows it should be in movement; and that all that is depends on movement
(934b34) Some of the followers of Heraclitus declare that stones and earth are formed from the drying and solidifying of fresh water and that the sun draws up vapors from the sea
(987a33) Heraclitus held that all sensible things are ever in a state of flux and there is no knowledge about them
(1012a24) The doctrine of Heraclitus, that all things are and are not, seems to make everything true
(1062a32) Perhaps if we had questioned Heraclitus himself in this way we might have forced him to confess that opposite statements can never be true of the same subjects
(1078b13) The supporters of the ideal theory were led to it because they were persuaded of the truth of the Heraclitean doctrine that all sensible things are ever passing away, so that if knowledge or thought is to have an object, there must be some other and permanent entities, apart from those which are sensible
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Empedocles

(252a7) Empedocles says that the constitution of the world is of necessity such that Love and Strife alternately predominate and cause motion, while in the intermediate period of time there is a state of rest
(279b15) That the world was generated all are agreed, but, generation over, some say that it is eternal, others say that it is destructible like any other natural formation. Empedocles believes that it alternates, being sometimes as it is now and sometimes different and in a process of destruction, and that this continues without end
(284a24) Empedocles says that the world, by being whirled round, received a movement quick enough to overpower its own downward tendency, and thus has been kept from destruction all this time
(295a8) Empedocles says that the motion of the heavens, moving about it at a higher speed, prevents movement of the earth
(302a29) Empedocles says that fire and earth and the related bodies are elementary bodies of which all things are composed
(314a16) Empedocles holds that the corporeal elements are four, while all the elements- including those which initiate movement- are six in number
(329b1) As principles we have firstly that which is potentially perceptible body, secondly the contrarieties (e.g. heat and cold), and thirdly fire, water, and the like. For these bodies change into one another (they are not immutable as Empedocles and other thinkers assert, since alteration would then have been impossible), whereas the contrarieties do not change
(333b1) A further objection to Empedocles is that it makes growth impossible unless it be increase by addition
(357a26) It is equally absurd to suppose that anything has been explained by calling the sea 'the sweat of the earth' like Empedocles. Metaphors are poetical and so that expression of his may satisfy the requirements of a poem, but as to knowledge of nature it is unsatisfactory
(369b12) Empedocles says that lightning consists of some of the sun's rays which are intercepted
(381b32) The moist is what makes the dry determinable, and each serves as a sort of glue to the other- as Empedocles said in his poem on nature, 'gluing meal together by means of water'
(387b4) Empedocles says: 'They are one and the same, hair and leaves and the thick wings of birds and scales that grow on stout limbs
(404b11) Thus Empedocles declares that it is formed out of all his elements each of them also being soul
(408a19) From Empedocles at any rate we might demand an answer to the following question- for he says that each of the parts of the body is what it is in virtue of a ratio between the elements: is the soul identical with this ratio, or is it not rather something over and above this which is formed in the parts?
(410a3) For each is, not merely the elements of which it is composed, but those elements combined in a determinate mode or ratio, as Empedocles himself says of bone
(410a28) Empedocles says that each set of things is known by means of its corporeal elements and by reference to something is shown by what we have just said which is like them
(415b28) Empedocles is wrong in adding that growth in plants is to be explained, the downward rooting by the natural tendency of earth to travel downwards, and the upward branching by the similar natural tendency of fire to travel upwards
(418b20) Empedocles was wrong in speaking of light as 'traveling' or being at a given moment between the earth and its envelope, its movement being unobservable by us
(427a22) Empedocles says that for tis in respect of what is present that man's wit is increased (he looks upon thinking as a bodily process like perceiving)
(437b24) Empedocles at times seems to hold that vision occurs when light issues forth from the eye, but other times he explains it by emanation from the visible objects
(441a4) Now the natural substance water tends to be tasteless. But either we must suppose that water contains in itself the various kinds of savor, though in amounts so small as to be imperceptible which is the doctrine of Empedocles; or the water must be a sort of matter, qualified, as it were to produce germs of savors of all kinds, so that all kinds of savor are generated from the water, though different kinds from its different parts; or else the water is in itself quite undifferentiated in respect of savor, but some agent, such for example as one might conceive heat or the sun to be, is the efficient cause of savor
(446a26) Empedocles says that the light from the sun arrives first in the intervening space before it comes to the eye, or reaches the earth
(477a32) Empedocles is then in error when he says that those animals which have the most warmth and fire live in the water to counterbalance the excess of heat in their constitution
(484a38) Empedocles says that nail is formed from sinew by a hardening process
(485b26) So Empedocles stated the nature of bone too simply; for, on the supposition that all bones follow the same proportion in the mixture of elements, the bones of a lion, a horse, and a man ought to be indistinguishable; whereas they actually differ in hardness and softness, density and other qualities
(640a15) Empedocles was in error when he said that many of the characteristics of animals were merely the results of incidental occurrences during their development
(910a15) Empedocles says that blueness of the eyes is due to an excess of internal heat whereas blackness is due to its absence
(937a15) Empedocles says that both rocks and stones come into being through the action of hot waters
(976b24) Empedocles says that there is no void
(985a2) Therefore, if we said that Empedocles in a sense is the first to mention the bad and the good as principles, we should perhaps be right, since the cause of all goods is the good itself
(985a21) And Empedocles, though he uses the causes to a greater extent than this, neither does so sufficiently, nor attains consistency in their use
(989a20) Empedocles is confronted by consequences some of which are peculiar to him. For we see these bodies produced from one another, which implies that the same body does not always remain fire or earth; and regarding the moving cause and the question whether we must suppose one or two, he must be thought to have spoken neither correctly nor altogether plausibly. And in general those who speak in this way must do away with change of quality, for on their view cold will not come from hot nor hot from cold. For if it did there would be something that accepted these very contraries, and there would be some one entity that became fire and water, which Empedocles denies
(998a30) Empedocles says fire and water, etc. are the constituent elements of things, but does not describe these as genera of existing things
(1000a24) Even the man whom one might suppose to speak most consistently- Empedocles, even he has made the same mistake; for he maintains that strife is a principle that causes destruction, but strife would seem none the less to produce everything, except the One; for all things excepting God proceed from strife
(1001a12) But the natural philosophers take a different line; e.g. Empedocles- as though referring it to something more intelligible- says what unity is; for he would seem to say it is Love; at least, this is for all things the cause of their being one
(1072a6) That actuality is prior is testified by Anaxagoras (for his thought is actuality) and by Empedocles in his doctrine of love and strife, and by those who say that there is always movement, e.g. Leucippus
(1075b7) Empedocles has a paradoxical view; for he identifies the good with love. But this is a principle both as mover (for it brings things together) and as matter (for it is part of the mixture) Now even if it happens that the same thing is a principle both as matter and as mover, still being them is not the same. In which respect then is love a principle? It is paradoxical also that strife should be imperishable; strife is for him the nature of the bad
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Anaximenes

(294b14) Anaximenes and Anaxagoras and Democritus give the flatness of the earth as the cause of its standing still.
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Anaximander

(187a21) Anaximander asserts that the contrarieties are contained in the one and emerge from it by segregation
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Anaxagoras

(187a22) Anaxagoras asserts that what is is one and many- for they produce other things from their mixture by segregation. He made both his homogeneous substances and his contraries infinite.
(203a20) Anaxagoras makes the elements infinite in number. The infinite is continuous by contact- compounded of the homogeneous parts. He held that any part is a mixture in the same way as the whole on the ground of the observed fact that anything comes out of anything. Once upon a time all things were together.
(205b1) Anaxagoras gives an absurd account of why the infinite is at rest. He says that the infinite itself is the cause of its being fixed. This is because it is in itself, since nothing else contains it- on the assumption that wherever anything is, it is there by its own nature.
(213a24) Anaxagoras refutes the existence of the void by straining wine-skins and showing the resistance of the air.
(250b24) Anaxagoras says that all things were together and at rest for an infinite period of time, and then mind introduced motion and separated them.
(256b24) So Anaxagoras is right when he says that mind is impassive and unmixed, since he makes it the principle of motion; for it could cause motion in this way only by being itself unmoved, and have control only by being unmixed.
(270b24) And so, implying that the primary body is something else beyond earth, fire, air and water, they gave the highest place the name of aether, derived from the fact that it 'runs always' for an eternity of time. Anaxagoras however misuses this name, taking aether as equivalent to fire.
(301a11) No natural fact can originate in chance. This is a point which Anaxagoras seems to have thoroughly grasped; for he starts his cosmogeny from unmoved things.
(302a29) Anaxagoras opposes Empedocles' view of the elements. Empedocles says that fire and earth and the related bodies are elementary bodies of which all things are composed; but this Anaxagoras denies. His elements are the homoeomerous things, viz. flesh, bone, and the like. Earth and fire are mixtures, composed of them and all the other seeds, each consisting of a collection of all the homoeomerous bodies, separately invisible; and that explains why from these two bodies all others are generated (to him fire and aether are the same thing)
(302b4) Of those who deny the existence of a void some, like Anaxagoras and Empedocles, have not tried to analyse the notions of light and heavy at all
(314a14) And yet Anaxagoras failed to understand his own utterance. He says, at all events, that coming to be and passing away are the same as being altered; yet he affirms that the elements are many (infinite)
(342b27) Anaxagoras and Democritus declare that comets are a conjunction of the planets, approaching one another and so appearing to touch one another
(345a25) Anaxagoras says that the milky way is the light of certain stars.
(348b12) Anaxagoras says a violent rain shower occurs when the cloud has risen into cold air
(365a17) Anaxagoras says that earthquakes occur when the ether, which naturally moves upwards, is caught in hollows below the earth and so shakes it
(369b14) Anaxagoras says lightning occurs when a part of the upper ether (which he calls fire) descends from above. Lightning is the gleam of this fire and thunder the hissing noise of its extinction in the cloud
(404a25) Anaxagoras declares that thought set the whole in movement i.e. the moving cause of things is the soul
(404b1) In many places Anaxagoras tells us that the cause of beauty and order is thought, elsewhere that it is soul
(405a13) Anaxagoras seems to distinguish between soul and thought, but in practice he treats them as a single substance, except that it is thought that he specially posits as the principle of all things; at any rate what he says is that thought alone of all that is is simple, unmixed and pure. He assigns both characteristics, knowing and origination of movement, to the same principle when he says that it was thought that set the whole in movement
(429a19) Anaxagoras says that since everything is a possible object of thought, mind, in order to dominate (that is, to know) must be pure from all admixture; for the copresence of what is alien to its nature is a hindrance and a block: it follows that it can have no nature of its own, other than that of having a certain capacity. Thus that in the soul which is called thought is, before it thinks, not actually any real thing. For this reason it cannot be regarded as blended with the body: if so it would acquire some quality, e.g. warmth or cold: as it is, it has none. It was a good idea to call the soul 'the place of forms', though this description holds only of the thinking soul, and even this is the forms only potentially, not actually
(470b33) Anaxagoras says that when fish discharge water through their gills, air is formed in the mouth for there can be no vacuum and they respire by drawing in this
(687a1) It is the opinion of Anaxagoras that the possession of these hands is the cause of man being, of all the animals, the most intelligent
(815a15) Anaxagoras declared that plants are animals and feel joy and sadness
(815b16) Anaxagoras declared that plants possessed intellect and intelligence
(816b26) Anaxagoras declared plants had respiration
(817a26) Anaxagoras said that the seeds of plants derive from the air
(903a8) Anaxagoras says that sounds are more audible at night because the air is heated during the day thus hisses and roars
(985a18) Anaxagoras uses reason as a deus ex machina for the making of the world and when he is at a loss to tell for what cause something necessarily is, then he drags reason in, but in all other cases ascribes events to anything rather than to reason.
(1069b20) Therefore not only can a thing come to be, out of that which is not, but also all things come to be out of that which is but is potentially, and is not actually. And this is the 'One' of Anaxagoras; for instead of all things were together' and the 'mixture' of Empedocles and Anaximander and the account given by Democritus, it is better to say all things were together potentially but not actually. Therefore these men seem to have had some notion of matter.
(1075b8) Anaxagoras makes the Good a motive principle; for thought moves things, but moves them for the sake of something which must be other than it
Anaxagoras says mind produces order and cause. To find why something is created, he must find out how it is best for that thing to be. Anaxagoras assigned to mind no causality for the order of the world, using all the elements as causes instead. Being unable to distinguish between the cause of a thing and the condition without which it could not be a cause, Anaxagoras says it is because of bones and sinews and all the rest that I do what I am doing and not through choice of what is best, though it is true if it were said that without such bones and sinew etc. I should not be able to do what I think is right(p99)
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Zero

No quantity whose magnitude is zero can exist(pm184)
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Zermelo-Fraenkel Set Theory

Zermelo's system does diverge from the theory of types in others of its axioms. There are Zermelo's axioms of power set, pairing, Aussonderung, sum, extensionality. Zermelo did not depict his system as disposed in types. Zermelo owned to a few additional axioms. There was the axiom of choice, which he originated and counted in, and an axiom of infinity. Zermelo's actual system was complicated by the distinction between class and individual. Zermelo's protections against the paradoxes consists essentially in eschewing too big classes. There is no class of everything(stl272)
Zermelo's natural numbers and von Neumann's have the great advantage over Gottlob Frege's of requiring no axiom of infinity(stl282)
For the assurance that classes fail to exist only if they would be bigger than all that exist, there was only very partial provision in Zermelo's schema of Aussonderung. Full provision was added rather by Fraenkel and Skolem in the axiom schema of replacement(stl284)
Zermelo's system in its main outlines came of the theory of types by the switch to general variables and cumulative types. The alternative departure from the theory of types that suggests itself is this: that we reconstrue unindexed variables as truly general variables (rather than as typically ambiguous)) but yet keep the restriction that the particular formulas put for 'Fx' must be stratified. Such is the system called "NF"(stl287)
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Zeno

(209a23) If space itself is an existent, it will be somewhere. Zeno's difficulty demands an explanation; for if everything that exists has a place, place too will have a place, and so on ad infinitum
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